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Abstract
This paper describes the design and behavior of an experimental economy with the
structure of the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model of optimal growth. The experiment includes
three diﬀerent implementations of the model: a decentralized implementation with multiple
agents and a market for capital, a treatment where individual subjects are placed in the
role of social planners, and a treatment where the social planner consists of ￿ve agents
making a joint decision. The ￿ndings highlight the role of market institutions in facilitating
convergence to the optimal steady state. (JEL C91,C 9 2 ,O 4 0 )
Understanding the process of economic growth is a fundamental task of modern economics.
Macroeconomists have certainly recognized the importance of questions of economic growth and
have devised an impressive array of theoretical models, analyzing the relationships between cur-
rent consumption, saving, and investment decisions of agents and future economic activity (see
Costas Azariadis, 1993, and Robert J. Barro and Xavier Sala-i-Martin, 1995, for extensive sur-
veys of growth models). One of the best known models, and one that has provided a framework
widely used in subsequent work, is the optimal growth model of F. P. Ramsey (1928), further
developed by David Cass (1965) and Tjalling C. Koopmans (1965). In the model, the economy is
assumed to behave like a representative agent, who can be viewed as a benevolent social planner
1or an ￿average￿ agent in the economy. The planner makes optimal investment and consumption
decisions over an in￿nite time horizon, given a utility of consumption and a ￿xed production
technology. If concave production and utility functions are assumed, there is a unique optimal
steady state, toward which consumption and capital stock levels converge monotonically over
time.
In this paper we introduce an experimental design, which we use to study some basic ideas
of growth theory. We construct a simple economy with the structure of the optimal growth
model of Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans. The version of the model we use is described in section I.
The empirical prediction tested in the experiment is whether an economy populated by human
decision-makers converges to the optimal steady state level. We test the prediction under two
diﬀerent levels of initial endowment, High Endowment, in which the starting level of capital stock
is greater, and Low Endowment, in which the starting level is lower, than at the optimal steady
state. Under High Endowment, the model predicts that both consumption and capital stock
converge to the optimal steady state from above, whereas under Low Endowment, convergence
is predicted to occur from below.
The experiment is not designed to assess whether the optimal growth model is a good de-
scription of how particular ￿eld economies grow, nor is it designed to simulate any national
economies or the world economy. Rather, the structure of the experimental economy is spec-
i￿ed to conform closely to the model, and to allow straightforward comparisons between the
numerical predictions of the model and the observed data.1 One of our treatments, the Social
Planner treatment, is designed to correspond as closely as possible to the literal formulation
of the theoretical model. In this treatment, individual agents are given the role of the social
planner and a monetary incentive to maximize the discounted sum of the utility of consumption
for the economy.
However, in addition to describing the behavior of a Social Planner, the model can also be
interpreted as describing the outcomes in a decentralized economy. The optimal steady state
2can be supported as a competitive equilibrium by decentralized, competitive markets in which
the price of capital equals its marginal product (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995). In the Market
treatment of our experiment, we explore whether the economy converges to its optimal steady
state when it has a decentralized structure. The Market treatment includes two features which
depart from the literal formulation of the theoretical model as a social planner￿s problem. (a)
The economy is populated with multiple heterogeneous agents and (b) a market for capital is
present with a structure that we believed would enhance the eﬃcient allocation of resources
between investment and consumption purposes. Trade in the market follows continuous double
auction rules, and these rules are known to be conducive to attaining the competitive equilibrium
prices and quantities exchanged in a wide class of market environments (Vernon L. Smith,
1962).2 Furthermore, the heterogeneity of agents ensures that gains from trade exist in the
market and perhaps makes it more likely that the market would be active. Recognizing that
the Market treatment has features that create relatively favorable conditions for convergence to
the optimal steady state, the ￿rst hypothesis we advance for evaluation is the following:
Hypothesis 1 The decentralized economy of the Market treatment converges to its optimal
steady state.
As we describe in detail in section III, the economies of the Market treatment do have a
strong tendency to converge to the optimal steady state levels of consumption and capital stock.
The price of capital also converges to the optimal steady state level. This is true regardless of
whether the initial level of capital is above or below the optimal steady state level. Our second
hypothesis is that the Social Planner treatment generates the same outcomes than the Market
treatment, as predicted by the theoretical model.
Hypothesis 2 The Social Planner treatment generates outcomes that are not diﬀerent from
those of the Market treatment.
Our data do not support hypothesis two. We ￿nd that the social planner￿s consumption
3level and capital stock holdings are farther from the optimal steady state than the economies
of the Market treatment. There is more variance in the consumption level over time and lower
overall welfare in the Social Planner treatment. This diﬀerence indicates that the institutional
structure can have an eﬀect on outcomes even when not predicted by the model. This result is
consistent with earlier research (Charles N. Noussair and Kenneth Matheny, 2000), which has
shown that dynamic optimization problems with the structure of the optimal growth problem
studied here are very diﬃcult for individual subjects to solve when they are placed alone in
the role of the social planner or representative agent.3 As described in later sections of the
paper, the decentralized economy achieves outcomes closer to the optimum despite the fact
that it allows several potential sources of ineﬃciency that the Social Planner does not. In the
Market treatment, (1) production output can be inside the production possibilities frontier, (2)
units produced can be consumed by agents other than those who value them most highly, (3)
individual agents do not have an incentive to maximize welfare at the aggregate level, and (4)
each agent has private information about her own valuations and costs.
The data from an additional treatment, the Planning Agency treatment, allows us to re￿ne
our conclusions. The only diﬀerence between the Planning Agency and the Social Planner
treatments is that a group of ￿ve planners, rather than just one, makes the consumption and
investment decisions of the economy. The Planning Agency achieves outcomes that are closer
to the optimal steady state than the single Social Planner. Therefore, some of the ineﬃciencies
of the Social Planner treatment occur because there is only a single agent.
Our ￿ndings underscore the role that markets and decentralized decision-making can have in
helping an economy to attain its potential level of output. The market allows the ￿ve agents of
our decentralized economy to behave as if the incentives of each of them were to maximize group
welfare, they each had full information about the economy, they could consult each other before
making their decisions, and they were constrained to produce along their frontier and to allocate
the output they produce eﬃciently. The market prices appear to be an eﬀective instrument to
4enable the economy to make the proper tradeoﬀ between consumption and investment.
I. The Model
In the theoretical model corresponding to our experiment, the economy behaves like a repre-
sentative agent, who maximizes the present discounted value of the utility of consumption u(ct)




where t indexes time period, ρ is the discount rate, ct is consumption at time t,a n du(ct)i st h e
utility of consumption at time t. Equation (1) is maximized subject to the constraints given in
equations (2) and (3).
(2) ct + kt+1 ≤ f(kt)+( 1− δ)kt, ∀t ≥ 0.
(3) kt+1 ≥ (1 − δ)kt, ∀t ≥ 0.
Equation (2) is a resource constraint. kt is the capital stock at time t. Depreciation of the
capital stock occurs at the rate δ ∈ (0,1]. The capital stock at time t, can be transformed,
using the production function f(kt) ,i n t oo u t p u t ,w h i c hc a nb ec o n s u m e di np e r i o dt or used
to augment the next period￿s capital stock kt+1, as in equation (2). Utility and production
functions u and f are assumed to be strictly increasing, concave, and diﬀerentiable. Equation
(3) rules out negative gross investment in capital stock. We also assume that the initial level of
capital stock, k0,i ss t r i c t l yg r e a t e rt h a n0 .
The ￿rst order conditions of the maximization problem in (1) require:
(4) u0(ct)=( 1+ρ)−1 [1 − δ + f0(kt+1)]u0(ct+1), ∀t ≥ 0
and the resource constraint (2) to be binding. Under the transversality condition (5) that the
discounted value of period t￿s capital stock approaches 0 as time approaches in￿nity,
(5) limt→∞(1 + ρ)−tu0(ct)kt+1 =0
there are unique steady state values of consumption and capital stock, ct = c and kt+1 = k, ∀t ≥
0, which satisfy:
5(6) c = f(k) − δk
and
(7) f0(k)=ρ + δ.
If the initial levels of capital stock and consumption are equal to (c,k), they will remain the
same in subsequent periods. If they are not equal to (c,k), the dynamics from period t to t +1
exhibit the properties that (a) for any given initial capital stock level, optimal sequences of con-
sumption and capital stock are unique, (b) convergence to the steady state of both consumption
and capital are strictly monotonic5 and (c) changes in the capital stock (net investment) are
larger the further kt is from the steady state.
II. The Market Treatment
A. Parameters
In the experiment, the economy￿s aggregate production capability was a discrete function
approximated by the continuous production function:
(8) f(Kt)=6 .96 ∗ (Kt)1/2
and the economy￿s aggregate marginal utility for consumption good was approximated by:
(9) u0(Ct)=3 1 0− 10Ct
corresponding to a utility function of u(Ct) = 310Ct −5(Ct)2. The approximations were chosen
so that (C,K)=( 1 2 ,10) was a solution to (6) and (7) for both the actual parameters of the
experiment and the continuous functions approximating them. We set ρ =1 /9a n dδ =1 . 6
There were two sets of parameters used. Under Low Endowment, the initial level of capital
stock in the economy was K0 = 5 and under High Endowment, the initial level of capital stock
was K0 = 20. There were no other diﬀerences between High and Low Endowment.
B. Individual Production and Consumption
In each period, which corresponds to a time period t in the theoretical model, each of the ￿ve
6subjects was endowed with a production function indicating his ability to transform capital into
output. We will denote individual i￿s production capability as fi(ki
t), where ki
t is agent i￿s capital
stock holding in period t. f(Kt), where Kt =
P
i ki
t, is the economy￿s production capability, as
de￿ned in section I. Agents could only make consumption and investment decisions in integer
amounts. The production function of each agent, shown in ￿gure 1, remained constant for each
subject from period to period. In other words, there were no exogenous shocks to production.
Each of the ￿rst ￿ve panels in ￿gure 1 indicates the quantity that each individual agent could
produce with a given amount of input. In these panels Units of Input denotes ki
t and Output
denotes fi(ki
t) .F o re x a m p l e ,i fa g e n t1u s e do n eu n i to fc a p i t a l( ki
t) in production in a period,
he could produce seven units of output (ci
t + ki
t+1), as indicated in the ￿rst panel. If he used a
total of two units in production in a period, he could produce eight units of output, implying a
marginal product of one unit of output for the second unit of input.
The last panel in the ￿gure is the economy-wide production capability, with Units of Input
and Output representing Kt and f(Kt) respectively. At the economy-wide level, the production
function was an approximation to (8). The production capability was allocated among the ￿ve
agents so that the ￿rst unit held by agent 1 produced seven units of output, the ￿rst unit held
by agent 2 produced three units, etc... Each agent knew only his own production function and
did not know the production functions of other agents.
However, for the economy to produce the output given by f(Kt), the particular agents who
have the highest marginal product for capital must use their capital in production. It is therefore
possible for the economy to produce well inside its production possibility frontier, and thus the
constraint in (2) need not bind. Under Low Endowment, each agent was endowed with one unit
of capital stock at the beginning of the time horizon for an economy-wide total of 5. Under
High Endowment, each agent was endowed with four units of capital stock at the beginning of
the time horizon so that the total initial endowment of the economy was 20 units.
7[Figure 1: About Here]
The utility of consumption good ct was expressed in terms of an experimental currency which
could be converted to US dollars at the end of the experiment. The conversion rate diﬀered
between agents to compensate for the higher earnings in terms of the experimental currency
due to the diﬀering production functions held by individual agents. The marginal utility of
consumption of each individual i was an approximation to Ui(ci
t) = 300 + 10i − 50ci
t implying
an economy-wide marginal utility of consumption of approximately U(Ct)=3 1 0−10Ct.7 Each
agent knew his own utility function, but not the utility functions of other agents. In the optimal
steady state, agents 4 and 5 each consume three units per period, and agents 1 - 3 each consume
two units per period, for an economy-wide total of 12 units of consumption per period. For this
pattern of consumption to occur, trade must take place in the capital market.
C. The Market for Capital
During each period, a computerized continuous double auction market for capital operated.
The market was open for a period of time, during which potential buyers and sellers could make
public oﬀers to purchase and sell units. An oﬀer consists of a price and a maximum quantity
oﬀered for purchase or sale. For example, a buyer may oﬀer to purchase up to 5 units at a per-
u n i tp r i c eo f1 0 0o ras e l l e rm a yo ﬀer to sell up to 3 units at a price of 300. At any time, buyers
or sellers may accept oﬀers made by agents on the other side of the market, and an acceptance
of an oﬀer means that a binding contact has occurred. Agents are not required to accept the
entire quantity oﬀered; they may accept only a portion of the total quantity oﬀered. In this
experiment, the market was computerized and used the Multiple Unit Double Auction (MUDA)
computer program (see Charles R. Plott and Peter Gray, 1990, for details on the operation of
MUDA).
An equilibrium market price for capital can be calculated for the optimal steady state of the
economy. Because capital Kt+1 could be substituted for consumption good Ct at a rate of 1 to
81 as in equation (2), the market price for capital must be the same as the marginal utility of
consumption. Since the value of an extra unit of Ct in any period is 180, the value of a unit of
investment must also equal 180. Therefore the equilibrium price for capital equals 180.
D. Timing
There are three notions of time in the experimental design. A period corresponds to a time t
in the theoretical model. We use the term horizon to refer to the entire life of an economy, that
is, the entire sequence of interrelated decisions of equation (1). Finally, we use the term session
to refer to a single day￿s activity in the laboratory. As described in the next two subsections and
a session may include more than one horizon. We use the term cohort to refer to each group of
￿ve subjects, who participated together as a group in a given session. There were seven cohorts
of subjects, many of whom participated as a group in more than one session.
Each session consisted of a sequence of periods. The initial period of the ￿rst horizon in
which each cohort of subjects participated was for practice. It was the only period during the
session which did not count toward ￿nal earnings. Each subject was endowed with 10,000 units
of currency and 1 (under Low Endowment) or 4 (under High Endowment) units of capital. This
currency was convertible to US dollars at the end of the experiment. Purchases (sales) in the
market for capital decreased (increased) this cash balance. The 10,000 units were endowed in the
form of a loan from the experimenter, which had to be paid back at the end of the horizon.8 The
cash balance and capital were reinitialized to the initial level after the practice period.
Within each period of the experiment, the sequence of events was as shown in ￿gure 2. At
the beginning of each period, production took place mapping input, ki
t, to output (which would
be allocated between ki
t+1 +ci
t at the end of the period) for each participant. Operationally, the
experimenter circulated among the subjects and pressed a sequence of keys on their computer
terminals. This action transformed the capital held by the agents from the amount that remained
at the end of the previous period to the amount available for subjects at the beginning of the
9current period, according to the relationship in ￿gure 1. Each subject had a sheet entitled
Production Schedule, outlining her production capability.
[Figure 2: About Here]
For the ￿rst two (or three) minutes of a market period,9 subjects were free to buy and sell
capital in the market. The market for capital was closed with one minute remaining in the
period. During the last minute of each period, subjects had an opportunity to allocate any
portion of their output to consumption, that is, to choose ci
t. Through consumption, subjects
were awarded a payment, which was added into their period earnings but not into the cash
available for future purchases. The period ended after consumption took place. The output
that was not consumed became the end of period capital stock, ki
t+1, and was transformed into
output for use in the next period. Pro￿ts within a period for an agent were given by his utility
of consumption for the quantity of units of ci
t he consumed, plus the change in the agent￿s cash
balance between the beginning and the end of the period. The cash balance at the end of each
period was carried over to the next period. Each subject kept the same utility function for the
entire horizon.
If the session was the ￿rst in which the particular cohort of subjects participated, the sequence
of activity in a session was the following: (a) When subjects ￿rst arrived at the experiment,
they were given approximately 50 minutes to review an interactive tutorial about using the
MUDA software. (b) The instructions of the experiment were handed out to each subject.
The experimenter read through the instructions for the subjects. Subjects were allowed to ask
questions any time they wanted. (c) The experimenter transformed the initial capital stock of
each subject based on his individual production function. (d) The market was opened for period
0 and subjects were able to trade with each other in the market during the ￿rst 3 minutes. (e)
In the last minute of period 0, subjects made consumption decisions. Subjects￿ earnings in
period 0 did not count toward their ￿nal earnings, though subjects were asked to calculate
10their hypothetical earnings to ensure that they understood the accounting procedure. (f) After
period 0 ended, inventories of cash and capital were both reinitialized to their starting values.
(g) Period 1 and subsequent periods proceeded in the same way as described in (c) - (e), except
that their earnings in the period did count toward their ￿nal US dollar earnings. After period
one, the cash and capital stock holdings were not reinitialized for the remainder of the horizon.
If the session represented a continuation of a previous session, the tutorial was not conducted.
However, the instructions for the experiment were read. The practice period was skipped and all
periods counted toward subjects￿ earnings. The initial values of capital stock and cash holdings
were set at the values of the end of the previous session in which subjects participated. As an
illustration, the timing of activity for session MktH1 is shown in ￿gure 3.
[Figure 3: About Here]
E. Implementing the Inﬁnite Horizon
To capture the incentive structure of the in￿nite time horizon in the optimal growth model,
we adopted a random ending rule to determine the end of the horizons. To implement the random
ending rule, the experimenter rolled a 20-sided die after each period, beginning in period 1, to
determine if the horizon would continue. If the die showed numbers 1 or 2, the horizon ended
immediately. Otherwise, the experiment continued to the next period within the same horizon.
The ten percent probability of ending implies a ρ =1 /9. The in￿nite horizon maximization
problem described in (1) - (3) is identical when there is a constant probability equal to ρ/(1+ρ)
of the horizon terminating in each period and no discounting of the utility of consumption from
period to period.10
Each session was scheduled for three hours. If a horizon ended less than one hour before
the scheduled end of a session, the session was immediately terminated. If a horizon ended
more than one hour before the scheduled end of the session, a new horizon began with the same
group, and with the same initial capital stock as the initial level of capital stock in the previous
11horizon.11 This meant that any given individual participated only in Low Endowment or only
in High Endowment economies.
If the horizon did not terminate before the scheduled session ending time, the horizon con-
tinued where it left oﬀ during another session. Subjects were oﬀered the opportunity to return
for the next session. If a subject chose to return she would resume her previous role, reclaiming
her previous utility and production functions. If a subject chose not to return, a substitute
would be recruited to take her place. The original subject would also be awarded the amount of
earnings made by her substitute. This procedure preserved the incentive for all subjects to make
optimal decisions in each period in accordance with the theoretical model.12 Thus the experi-
menter paid out the substitute￿s earnings twice, once to the substitute himself and once to the
original subject for whom he substituted. Substitutes were recruited from the same subject pool
as other members of the group. The substitutes were required to arrive early for the sessions
and go through the tutorial in the use of the software.
F .T h eA v a i l a b l eD a t a
Thirteen sessions comprised the market treatment. All sessions were conducted at Purdue
University. None of the subjects had ever participated in a similar experiment before, though
some of them had previous experience with the same computer program in other types of ex-
periments. Each of the 13 sessions lasted between 2 and 3 hours. There were seven cohorts of
subjects. Cohorts MktL2 and MktH3 consisted of graduate students in Management at Purdue
University. The other ￿ve cohorts consisted of undergraduate students recruited from introduc-
tory level courses in economics at Purdue University.13
III. Results from the Market Treatment
Figures 4a-d illustrate the time path of consumption in all horizons in which each of the four
cohorts in the High Endowment treatment participated. Figures 5a-c show analogous data for
12the Low Endowment treatment.14 The impression given by the ￿gures is that after the group
gains experience with the decision situation, consumption is very close to the optimal steady
state level.
[Figures 4a - 5c: About Here]
The following linear regression model can be used to estimate the level of consumption toward












In the above equation, C
jm
t denotes the economy￿s consumption level in period t of the mth
horizon in which cohort j participated. Dj is a dummy variable for cohort j and t denotes
time period within a horizon. For example, Dj equals 1 if the data are generated by cohort j.
t =1i nt h e￿rst period of any horizon, not only in the ￿rst one in a session nor only the ￿rst
horizon in which a given group participates. The model allows for the estimation of the value
of the dependent variable at the beginning of each horizon and the value to which the series is
converging. In the ￿rst period of a horizon populated by cohort j the variable Dj/t = 1 and
all of the other variables equal 0. Therefore, β11 is the estimated value of the time series at
the beginning of a horizon populated by cohort 1. The variables Dj/t and coeﬃcients β1j are
analogous. The speci￿cation assumes that there is a common point of origin for each horizon
in which each group participates. For later periods within a horizon of cohort j the Dj/t term
decreases toward 0, while the variable (t − 1)/t increases toward 1. If t were projected to the
in￿nite future (t − 1)/t would converge to 1. Therefore β2 can be interpreted as the asymptote
to which the time series is converging. The speci￿cation assumes that there is a common value
to which the time series is converging for all horizons and for all groups. In the estimation the
complete data from all periods in all horizons is used. We will say that we cannot reject the
hypothesis that a variable converges to its optimal steady state value if the estimated β2 is not
signi￿cantly diﬀerent from that value.
13A. Consumption
The model predicts that consumption converges over time toward a value of 12 and a variance
of zero. The average per-period consumption level, averaged over all periods six and greater
(to exclude observations that are occur early in the horizon, when they would be far away from
the optimal steady state even along the optimal trajectory) for all horizons in the treatment, is
g i v e ni nt h er i g h t m o s tc o l u m no ft a b l e s1a n d2 .T h ee s t i m a t e sf r o mt h er e g r e s s i o nm o d e lf o r
consumption at time t are included in the tables16 for High and Low Endowment respectively,
in the rows labeled Consumption. The standard errors of the estimates are in parentheses.
The estimated values of β2 for economy-wide consumption are 12.10 and 12.15 for High and
Low Endowment, respectively. The optimal steady state level of consumption of 12 lies well
within a 95 percent con￿dence interval of the estimated β2 for both treatments. Therefore, we
cannot reject the hypothesis that the consumption level is converging to the optimal steady state
level. The convergence occurs whether or not the initial value of capital stock is above or below
the optimal steady state level. Under High Endowment, the estimated level of consumption at
the beginning of each horizon, the β1j term, is greater than the optimal steady state level of 12.
In every horizon of Low Endowment, the estimated initial value is less than 12. Thus, for all
seven groups, we observe convergence to the optimal steady state level of consumption from the
predicted direction. The averages in both treatments are also very close to 12. The regression
con￿rms the visual impression from ￿gures 4 and 5.
The model is also estimated for the dependent variable |Ct − C|, the absolute deviation of
consumption from the optimal steady state level. The model predicts that |Ct − C| converges
to zero. The estimates of the absolute deviations are included in tables 1 and 2. For both
High and Low Endowment, β2 is smaller than any of the β1j estimates, indicating decreasing
variation over time even as period consumption converges to 12. However, both β2 estimates
are signi￿cantly diﬀerent from 0, (0.74 and 0.85 in High and Low Endowment, respectively), so
14there remains some tendency, even asymptotically, for consumption to ￿uctuate though it is on
average no diﬀerent from the predicted level.
[Tables 1 and 2: About Here]
B. Capital Stock and Prices
Tables 1 and 2 also contain the estimates for capital stock. In both treatments, the averages
9.86 and 10.35 are close to 10. Under High Endowment, the estimated value to which capital
stock levels are converging, 11.42, is signi￿cantly diﬀerent from the optimal steady state level of
10. The estimate of 10.74 for Low Endowment is not diﬀe r e n tf r o m1 0 .F o re a c ho ft h ef o u rH i g h
Endowment cohorts, the estimated values for the beginning of the time series are all greater than
β2,r e ￿ecting a depletion of capital stock levels over time as predicted in the theoretical model.
Under Low Endowment the estimated capital stock at the beginning of two of the sessions is
below the optimal steady state level, as predicted by the model. In the remaining session, it is
above the optimal steady state level, re￿ecting a high level of investment in the early periods.
The tables also contain the results of a similar estimation for the average price of capital by
period. The estimation shows that the price of capital converges to the optimal steady state.
The estimated values of β2 are 182.74 and 173.76 for High and Low Endowment, respectively.
Neither is signi￿cantly diﬀerent from the equilibrium price of capital in the optimal steady state,
180. Under Low Endowment, in all three groups, the prices converge to the optimal steady state
level from above as predicted. However, under High Endowment, we do not ￿nd that the price
of capital converges to the optimal steady state level from below.
Closer inspection of the capital market sheds light on the ability of the economy to converge
over time to the optimal steady state. It appears that the prices established in the market for
capital provide signals that induce the economy to allocate resources between consumption and
investment in a way that pushes it toward the optimal steady state. In the last horizon that each
group of subjects participated in, the correlations between Pt, the average transaction price in
15period t, and subsequent net investment, Kt+1−Kt, were 0.52 for the Low Endowment data and
0.08 for the High Endowment data. The positive correlations indicate that the higher the price
of capital, the more positive was net investment immediately following the closing of the market.
The correlation between Pt and Ct,c o n s u m p t i o ni np e r i o dt, is -0.54 for Low Endowment and
-0.13 for High Endowment. This indicates that consumption increases after the price of capital
falls (consumption in period t occurs after the market closes for period t). Each of the four
correlations is signi￿cantly diﬀerent from zero at the 5% level of signi￿cance.
C. Coordination of Production and Consumption Activity Among Agents
The ability of the economy to attain the optimal steady state is all the more impressive
when one considers that for the economy to produce along its production possibility frontier, a
non-trivial coordinating function has to be performed by the economy. To attain the frontier, at
the end of trading in the market and the consumption phase, the capital stock must be held by
those agents who have the highest marginal product of capital. A typical time series of Actual
Production vs. Eﬃcient Production is shown in ￿gure 6, which illustrates the two time series for
the data from cohort MktL2. The Eﬃcient Production is the production that would result if the
economy￿s units of capital were reallocated to the agents who had the highest marginal product
of capital, so that the economy would achieve the highest feasible level of output given its current
stock of capital. The ￿rst horizon, which lasted only two periods, shows some ineﬃciency as in
period 2, the capital stock in the economy could have produced 21 units of output Ct +Kt+1 if
the appropriate agents held it. However only 18 units were produced. In the second horizon of
the session, the actual production was one unit below the frontier in the fourth and ￿fth periods
of the horizon, but was along the frontier in all later periods. The economy￿s output converged
to the optimal steady state level of 22, which at the optimum would be allocated as 12 units of
Ct and 10 units of Kt+1.
[Figure 6: About Here]
16The actual production was a very high percentage of the optimal level for all seven cohorts,
indicating that the economies tended to produce along their frontiers. The actual production av-
eraged 98.8, 98.3 and 99.2 percent of the eﬃcient production level for the three Low Endowment
cohorts. It averaged 97.2, 99.7, 100, and 99.5 percent for the four High Endowment cohorts,
for an overall cohort average of 99.0. One percent of potential production was lost from being
at the interior of the production possibilities frontier. In 10.3 percent of the periods of High
Endowment, production was suboptimal in the sense that a reallocation of capital could have
increased output. Under Low Endowment, the corresponding ￿gure was 19.6 percent.
From the individual consumption data, the Consumption Eﬃciency,am e a s u r eo fw e l f a r e ,o f
the economy can be calculated. In the optimal steady state, the total earnings from consumption
for the ￿ve agents in the economy are 2940 units of experimental currency. We measure the
eﬃciency of the economy by calculating the realized earnings from consumption each period and
dividing them by 2940. In the optimal steady state the level of eﬃciency is 1 (or 100 percent).
It is an imperfect measure of welfare for our economies, because eﬃciency can be greater than
one if suboptimal overconsumption occurs. However, consumption eﬃciency less than 1 late in
a horizon indicates clear suboptimality.
The average eﬃciency levels in periods 6 and later were 99.1 percent under High and 96.0
percent under Low endowment. Using the convergence model of equation (10), we can estimate
the consumption eﬃciency level to which the economy is converging. The estimates, shown in
tables 1 and 2, in the row labeled Realized u(Ct) as Percent of Optimum, indicate that the data
are converging to 0.979 and 0.989, in the High and Low Endowment treatments respectively.
These levels not signi￿cantly diﬀerent from 1. The economies are converging to full consumption
eﬃciency. Not only does output tend to be produced by those with the highest marginal prod-
ucts, and total output tend to converge to the optimal steady state quantity, but individual-level
consumption tends to be realized by those with the highest marginal utilities. The eﬃciency loss
from suboptimal consumption of actual production, which could be eliminated by the transfer
17of units to the agents with the highest marginal products, averaged 3.6 percent of the total
realized u(Ct).
IV. The Social Planner Treatment
In this section we consider the role that the departures from the literal formulation of the
theoretical model that were included in the Market treatment played in guiding the economy
to its optimum. We compare the outcomes generated in the Market treatment to the outcomes
that result when individual subjects are placed in the role of the social planner, and are given
a monetary incentive to maximize the objective function given in equation (1), subject to the
constraints (2) and (3). In this treatment, called the Social Planner treatment, we try to
reproduce the literal formulation of the model as closely as possible.
In the Social Planner treatment, individual subjects were endowed with either 5 (for subjects
with Low Endowment) or 20 (for subjects with High Endowment) units of capital stock at
the beginning of each time horizon. Each individual was endowed with the entire economy￿s
production technology f(Kt) and the economy￿s entire utility function u(Ct). The actual discrete
values used for production and consumption were identical to those in shown ￿gure 1 and listed
in footnote 7. There were eight subjects in the Social Planner treatment, four under High and
four under Low Endowment.17 At no time did any of these subjects interact with or observe
decisions made by any other participants.
The sequence of activities within each period was similar to what has been described in
Section II.D. However, since there was no market for exchanging capital between subjects, the
procedure was simpli￿ed and did not require computerization. At the beginning of period t,
production took place mapping current capital stock, Kt, into output, Ct + Kt+1. Subjects
produced by ￿lling out a form with the value of f(Kt), which they could determine from their
Production Schedules. This had the eﬀect of guaranteeing that the economy in the Social
Planner treatment always produced along its production possibility frontier because it forced
18constraint (2) to bind. The experimenter then circulated among the subjects and veri￿ed that
they had written down the correct quantity of output. Subjects then had three minutes to decide
how to allocate the output between consumption Ct and end-of-period capital stock Kt+1.A
subject￿s period earnings were equal to the cash award that he received from consumption, that
is earnings were proportional to u(Ct). Under High (Low) Endowment the conversion rate from
experimental currency to US dollars was 3500 (2500) = 1 dollar. The period ended after the
three minutes had elapsed. To determine if the horizon would continue, we used the random
ending rule described in Section II.E.
In sessions that were the ￿rst in which the subjects participated, the sequence of activity
in a session was the following. (a) The instructions for the experiment were handed out to
the subjects. The experimenter read through the instructions. Subjects were permitted to ask
questions as the instructions were being read. (b) The experimenter transformed the subject￿s
initial capital stock into output. (c) The subject was given 3 minutes to allocate his output
between consumption and end-of-period capital stock for a practice period (period 0), which
did not count toward his ￿nal earnings. (d) After the end of period 0, the inventories of capital
stock were reinitialized to the starting values of either 5 or 20. (e) Period 1 and subsequent
periods proceeded in a similar manner as period 0, except that the subject￿s earnings starting
from period 1 did count toward his ￿nal earnings, and that the capital stock was not reinitialized
for the remainder of the horizon.
[Figures 7a - 8d: About Here]
Figure 7a-d show the consumption data from all horizons for subjects in the Social Plan-
ner treatment with High Endowment. Figures 8a-d graph analogous data for Low Endowment.
From the ￿gures one gains the impression that, with the exception of one subject in the Low
Endowment treatment, subjects￿ consumption decisions tend to exhibit greater absolute devi-
ations from the optimal steady state level of consumption than under the Market treatment.
19There are frequent large changes in consumption from period to period. In general, the data re-
semble those reported by Noussair and Matheny (2000).18 The diﬀerence between the observed
consumption and the optimal steady state level suggests that the overall level of welfare in the
Social Planner treatment is lower than in the data from the Market treatment.
[Tables 3 and 4: About Here]
Tables 3 and 4 show the averages of consumption, absolute deviation of consumption from
the optimum, capital stock, and eﬃciency for the Social Planner treatment under both High and
Low Endowment. The data in the tables con￿rm the impression that the Social Planner data is
more volatile than the Market data. The last column of the tables, which indicates the overall
average value of the variable from period six onward, shows a larger standard deviation for every
comparable variable in both treatments (8 of 8 variables). The volatility is also apparent in the
average and the estimated asymptote of |Ct−C|, which is much larger than in Market, indicating
greater variance of consumption under both High and Low Endowment, even asymptotically, in
Social Planner.
The estimated coeﬃcients of the model of convergence are given in tables 3 and 4. As before,
β1j equals the initial value for each economy, and the β2 terms are the estimated asymptotes of
the time series. In table 3, the estimates for High Endowment are given. Three of the four vari-
ables converge to values signi￿cantly diﬀerent from the predicted levels. The absolute deviations
of consumption from the optimum are signi￿cantly diﬀe r e n tf r o m0a n dm u c hl a r g e rt h a ni nt h e
Market treatment, and the realized consumption eﬃciency of the economies is substantially and
signi￿cantly below 100 percent. The estimates suggest that, even though the economy had on
average a capital stock equal to the optimal steady state level, average consumption could not
be sustained at the optimal level, due to the large ￿uctuations in consumption and investment
from period to period. The low and variable consumption is re￿e c t e di nl o we ﬃciency estimates.
The estimates from the Low Endowment data, displayed in table 4, exhibit a somewhat
20diﬀerent pattern. Consumption is estimated to be converging to close to the optimal steady
state level but do so on a level of capital stock that is too high. The absolute deviations of
consumption from the optimal steady state level are large and signi￿cant. The ￿uctuations in
consumption mean that to sustain an average level of consumption at the optimal steady state
level, the amount of capital required is greater than the optimal level.
In the Market treatment, the β2 estimate is closer to the optimal steady state level than all
but one β1j estimate for all four dependent variables, Ct,K t+1,u(Ct), and |Ct−C| (27 out of 28
estimates, 7 β1k terms * 4 dependent variables). However, in the Social Planner treatment, the
β2 estimate is closer than the corresponding β1j in 25 of 32 cases. Convergence is more reliable
in the Market treatment than in Social Planner. This is consistent with a comparison of ￿gures
4a n d5w i t h￿gures 7 and 8. Figures 4 and 5 give the impression of smooth convergence to a
greater extent than ￿gures 7 and 8.
V. A Planning Agency
One explanation for the diﬀerences between the Market and Social Planner treatments is
that the Market treatment is more likely to ￿nd the optimum simply because there are ￿ve
agents rather than one, so that there is on average ￿ve times the cognitive capacity present.
Furthermore, since the Market treatment allows agents to observe some of the actions of others,
good decisions can be imitated by other agents.
To study the eﬀect of the addition of multiple decision-makers to the Social Planner treatment
we include a third treatment that we call the Planning Agency treatment. This treatment
closely resembles the Social Planner treatment except that a group of ￿ve people has the role
of the planner. Each of the ￿ve participants is informed of the aggregate utility and production
functions of the economy and receives a dollar payment proportional to the realized value of
u(Ct), the economy-wide utility level. Thus, the incentives are perfectly aligned; each of the ￿ve
members has an incentive to maximize total welfare.
21There were six new cohorts recruited for this treatment. Three cohorts participated in Low
and three participated in High Endowment conditions. The procedures were identical to the
Social Planner treatment except for the following diﬀerences. In each period, four of the ￿ve
members of the economy were required to propose an allocation of resources to investment and
consumption, given the current capital stock level. The proposals were collected by the experi-
menter who delivered them to the ￿fth participant, who was designated as the ￿spokesperson￿
for that period. This participant chose Ct and Kt+1 on behalf of all members of the economy, by
writing the choice on a form and submitting it to the experimenter. She was free to incorporate
or ignore the proposals of the other agents. After consumption and investment were chosen,
the experimenter recorded the choice on the blackboard, so that the spokesperson could record
the earnings of the group. Afterwards, four subjects were invited to propose consumption and
investment for the following period. The role of decision-maker rotated among the ￿ve agents
so that a given agent played that role in every ￿fth period. When making decisions, subjects
could observe on the blackboard the history of previous consumption and capital stock levels in
the economy. Sessions lasted between 2 and 3 hours.
This particular information structure was chosen over alternatives where there was more or
less explicit communication so that the interaction between subjects was at a similar level of
depth as in the Market treatment. The nature of the institutions does not allow us to hold the
level of communication constant between the Market and the Planning Agency treatments, but
the structure we chose appeared to be reasonably close to the level of communication that occurs
through market prices. For example, allowing unrestricted communication would be excessive,
while rotating the role of planner and allowing him only to observe decisions of the previous
periods￿ planners would be insuﬃcient.
The only diﬀerences between the Planning Agency and the Social Planner treatment is the
presence of multiple decision makers, and any diﬀerences between the outcome variables in the
two treatments is due to having one vs. ￿ve agents. Diﬀerences between the Market and the
22Planning Agency treatments may be due to several factors, but not to a diﬀerent number of
agents. The Planning Agency treatment has the same advantages that the Social Planner has
over the Market treatment: alignment of incentives of all agents, constraints prohibiting pro-
duction inside the frontier, constraints guaranteeing consumption by the highest valued agents,
and the absence of private information.
[Figures 9a-10c and tables 5 and 6: About Here]
Figures 9a-10c show the time series of consumption in the Planning Agency treatment. The
choices appear to be on average close to the optimal steady state level of 12, but show more
variance than in the Market treatment. The estimates from the regression model (10) are shown
in tables 5 and 6. The estimated β2￿s are 11.97 for High and 12.34 for Low Endowment. Neither
is signi￿cantly diﬀerent from 12. In both equations, β2 is closer to 12 than any of the β1j terms.
Convergence occurs from the predicted direction for all six cohorts.
Though the quantity of consumption is converging toward the optimal steady state, there is
more variance in consumption than in the Market treatment. The estimated asymptotic values
of |Ct − C| equal 2.53 and 1.52, greater than in the corresponding values in Market, but less
than those in Social Planner. Overall, under Planning Agency, the standard deviations of all
eight variables in periods 6 and greater are lower than in Social Planner. In seven of eight
instances they are higher in Planning Agency than in Market. Planning agency exhibits smaller
￿uctuations than Social Planner but larger ￿uctuations than Market.
The tables also show that the capital stock and eﬃciency levels are also converging to the
optimal steady state values. Whatever ineﬃciency that is present is due to the ￿uctuations
of consumption and capital stock around the optimal steady state. In contrast, the Market
treatment exhibits less eﬃciency loss due to ￿uctuations in overall consumption and capital
stock, but instead has losses due to suboptimal allocation of production and consumption among
agents.
23VI. Discussion
In the Market treatment, we observe a strong tendency for the variables in the economy:
consumption, capital stock, the price of capital, and the realized utility of consumption, to
evolve to the optimal steady state levels. There is some variation in these variables from period
t op e r i o d ,a so n em i g h te x p e c ti na ne c o n o m yi nw h i c h￿ve agents must coordinate their decisions
every period. However, the model performs remarkably well in describing the state toward which
the economy is converging over time.
The experiment provides an example of the role that institutions, particularly market insti-
tutions, can play in enabling an economy to allocate its resources eﬃciently. Welfare is higher
and departures from the optimal steady state are smaller in the Market treatment than in the
Social Planner treatment. The diﬀerence exists despite some inherent advantages for the Social
Planner. The planner is aware of the aggregate structure of the economy, whereas the mar-
ket treatment has only market activity to reveal the information. The planner is exogenously
constrained to produce on its frontier and allocate consumption eﬃciently, whereas the market
must coordinate production and consumption in a decentralized manner.
The Planning Agency treatment also leads to a substantial improvement over the Social
Planner. The economies in the Planning Agency treatment converge to the optimal steady state
in terms of average consumption, capital stock and eﬃciency. However, these variables exhibit
more variance than in the Market treatment. While there is some eﬃciency loss because of this
volatility, the Planning Agency generally attains as high a level of welfare as Market, because
i tt h es a m ei n h e r e n ta d v a n t a g e so v e rt h eM a r k e tt r e a t m e n ta st h eS o c i a lP l a n n e rd o e s .
How do the economies of the Market treatment manage to allocate resources eﬃciently
between consumption and investment, in a decentralized setting in which each agent knows only
his own production and utility functions? It appears that the existence of a price for capital
encourages agents to make better tradeoﬀs between consumption and investment. The market
24price converges to a level at which the marginal utility of using capital for consumption and for
investment is equated. The market price appears to serve as an informative signal of scarcity.
When the price is higher (lower) than the optimal steady state level, capital stock tends to rise
(fall).
The heterogeneity of agents may also enhance the operation of the capital market, because it
implies potential gains from trading capital in each period. This creates an incentive to use the
market for capital, and leads to the establishment of a competitive equilibrium market price,
which in turn facilitates optimal decision making on the part of agents. Had our agents all been
identical, the incentive to use the market would have been weaker, much of the activity in the
markets might have been due to mistakes on the part of subjects, and prices might have failed
to stabilize at the competitive level. In that case we may not have observed convergence to the
optimal steady state.19
Another feature of our economies that may promote convergence is the global concavity
of the production function. This ensures that convergence toward the optimal steady state is
always predicted, for any positive level of current capital stock. Early errors in decision making
do not prevent the economy from converging to the optimum later on. Suppose that there is an
initial stage of the experiment in which subjects make mistakes as they learn about the decision
environment, that as individuals acquire more experience in the experiment, they make better
decisions.20 If subjects begin to make optimal decisions at any time, the economy is predicted
to converge to the optimal steady state level from that point on, regardless of previous history.
Future experiments can be conducted that relax the concavity assumption on the production
function. In particular, if the production function includes a region in which increasing returns
are present, multiple locally optimal steady states can exist, with diﬀerent basins of attraction.
The current paper introduces a type of experimental economy that will converge to an optimal
steady state level when it is unique. However, to which, if any, steady states will the economy
converge if it has multiple locally optimal steady states? Will it converge to the predicted steady
25state given its initial endowment? Will it always converge to the steady state with the highest
levels of consumption and capital stock? Experimental work has shown that there are normal
form games where play converges to Pareto-dominated equilibria (see for example Russell W.
Cooper et al., 1990 or John B. Van Huyck et al., 1990). It is possible that economies organized
as Social Planners or Planning Agencies may actually be more conducive to optimal equilibrium
selection than those organized like our Market treatment. It may be easier for a planner or
team of planners to switch from a suboptimal equilibrium to a better one, than it would be for
multiple agents in a decentralized economy to recoordinate on the better equilibrium.
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1. Although this paper is the ￿rst experimental study of a growth model, there is an active
literature on laboratory testing of macroeconomic models. See John Duﬀy (1998) for a recent
survey of experimental studies of monetary economics.
2. The capital that trades in our markets has a diﬀerent and more complex structure than
the goods traded in previous studies, in which the competitive equilibria are observed. In
previous studies, the good traded in the market typically has an exogenous value of consumption
speci￿ed by the experimenter and consumption occurs at the end of the current market period.
As we describe in detail in section II, the capital traded in our markets has two possible uses,
consumption and investment, so that a consumer￿s willingness to pay is a function of the value
of both uses. Calculating that value is complicated by the fact that the value of capital used
in investment depends on activity in future periods. Thus, it is a priori by no means obvious
from the results of previous studies that our markets for capital will operate at or near their
30competitive equilibrium.
3. Other researchers have also found that dynamic optimization problems are diﬃcult for
individual subjects to solve. See for example, Richard Thaler (1981), John D. Hey and Valentino
Dardanoni (1988), Gary Gigliotti and Barry Sopher (1997), Ernst Fehr and Peter K. Zych (1998),
and the survey by Colin Camerer (1995).
4. Equations (1)-(3) are written as an optimization problem for an individual agent. However,
under the assumption that the individual is a representative agent, the optimization of aggregate
welfare by a social planner has the same structure.
5. Capital stock and consumption converge from the same direction toward the optimal
steady state. That is, if k0 < k then ∀t,kt < k and ct < c.I fk0 > k then ∀t,kt > k and ct > c.
6. We use the notation ct and kt to denote the consumption and capital stock holdings of
a representative agent, as in the theoretical model described in section I. Ct and Kt denote
the aggregate quantities in the Market treatment, which is the sum of the individual holdings
of the ￿ve heterogeneous members of the economy. The consumption and capital stock of an
individual i at time t will be denoted as ci
t and ki
t. Subjects make decisions only observing
the total function g(Kt)=f(Kt)+( 1− δ)Kt, the total output including undepreciated capital
stock. This means that a depreciation rate other than 1 could be used without changing the
design of the experiment. The main impact of setting δ = 1 is that it admits the possibility
of the capital stock of an individual to fall to 0 at any time, if he consumes all of his output.
Therefore, the fact that δ =1m a ym a k ei tm o r ed i ﬃcult to reach the optimal positive steady
state, because it permits the economy to exhaust its entire stock of capital, at which point
it cannot be reaccumulated. Of course, despite the fact that δ =1 ,t h ee c o n o m yr e m a i n s
dynamic in structure in that positive gross investment is required in every period to assure
future consumption.
7. The marginal valuations, measured in terms of the experimental currency, for ci
t were
260,210,160,110,60 and 10 for agent 1. For agent 2, the marginal values were 270, 220, 170, 120,
3170, and 20; for agent 3, 280, 230, 180, 130, 80, and 30; for agent 4, 290, 240, 190, 140, 90, and
40, and for agent 5, 300, 250, 200, 150, 100, and 50.
8. Loaning money to the subjects in this manner creates the possibility that subjects may lose
money over the course of the experiment. However in this study, the pro￿ts from consumption
provided a suﬃcient degree of pro￿t each period so that no subject had negative total earnings
at the end of any session.
9. To allow subjects some time to become familiar with the procedures of the experiment,
the market phase in the ￿rst two periods of the ￿rst horizon in which a group participated lasted
three minutes, and in all other periods the market phase was two minutes long.
10. The equivalence of a random ending rule such as the one we use and an in￿nite horizon
requires risk neutrality of agents. If agents are risk averse they would overconsume under a
random ending rule, because they would underweight the future uncertain payoﬀ relative to risk
neutral agents. Equivalence of the two decision situations also requires subjects to believe that
the random draws that determine termination are independent and identically distributed from
period to period. The use of a random ending rule to create an in￿nite horizon decision situation
with discounting has been used in previous experimental studies. See for example Camerer and
Keith Weigelt (1993) or Noussair and Matheny (2000).
11. Reinitializing in this manner does not aﬀect the optimal solution to the optimization
problem in (1), because the probability of a restart is completely independent of any subject￿s
decisions.
12. One drawback of using the same subjects for multiple sessions is that they may commu-
nicate between the sessions, despite our requests that they not do so. However, we felt that the
risk was necessary to preserve the incentives of the in￿nite horizon. Because we did not notice
sudden changes in decisions immediately after subjects returned for a second or a third session,
we are con￿dent that our results are not due to any communication between subjects between
sessions.
3213. We were quite surprised by the high percentage of subjects who preferred to return for
another session, even though they knew that they would be paid the earnings achieved by their
substitutes if they did not return.
14. In the experiment, production and consumption were restricted to integer amounts.
A shooting algorithm can be used to compute optimal sequences of capital and consumption
without the integer restriction. The algorithm is similar to one used by Robert G. King and
Sergio T. Rebelo (1989, 1993). Rounded to the nearest integer, the sequence of consumption
levels under High Endowment are 17, 15, 13, 13, 12 for periods 1-5, and 12 thereafter. Under
Low Endowment the sequence is 9, 10, 11, 12 in periods 1-4 and 12 thereafter.
15. This model of convergence was ￿rst used by Noussair et al. (1995).
16. All estimates in tables 1-6 are Feasible GLS estimates from panel data models with
the data from each cohort comprising one panel. The panel data format is appropriate since
each cohort generates an independent time series from identical initial conditions. The error
is assumed to arise from the randomness that exists in experimental markets due to noise in
the actions of agents. Our recording technology allows us to assume that there are no errors in
measurement of the variables themselves. The estimates assume ￿rst order autocorrelation with
a parameter ρ that is common to all cohorts. The assumption of ￿rst-order autocorrelation is
natural in market experiments of this type, since activity in one period in￿uences decisions in
the following period.
17. At ￿rst glance, using four subjects might appear to be too small a sample size. However,
unlike in the Market treatment, each subject is an independent economy in the Social Plan-
ner treatment, so that the number of independent observations equals the number of agents.
Furthermore, the data conformed to our priors, which were based on the results reported by
Noussair and Matheny (2000), who studied 65 similar economies. After eight observations, we
had con￿dence that the patterns we were observing would be con￿rmed had we gathered more
data.
3318. In the Noussair and Matheny study, subjects were given the role of social planners in
a similar manner to the Social Planner treatment. The production functions used in the study
were f(Kt)=2 5 .23K0.2
t and f(Kt)=0 .884K0.9
t Under the ￿rst production function, predicted
convergence to the optimal steady state is faster than under the second. δ was equal to 0.5.
Subjects make decisions for 20 ￿in￿nite￿ horizons, but were not required to spend a minimum
amount of time on each decision. They were required to spend a minimum of 75 minutes on
the 20 horizons. Subjects averaged about 25 seconds per decision. There was no tendency to
smooth out consumption. Rather, consumption was characterized by bouts of overconsumption
followed by bouts of underconsumption, as in the Social Planner treatment data given here, and
as illustrated in ￿gures 8 and 9. Eﬃciency averaged 83.6% in treatments comparable to those of
this paper. We consider as comparable treatments those using the same subject pool, Purdue
undergraduates, and using the same random ending rule to implement the in￿nite horizon. In
the Noussair and Matheny study, the results were similar if a Fixed ending rule, in which the
horizon was certain to terminate after 10 periods, was used. The results also replicated in
ad i ﬀerent subject pool, undergraduate students at Waseda University in Tokyo, Japan (see
Fumihiko Hiruma and Noussair, 1998, for a detailed analysis).
19. See Alan P. Kirman (1992, page 134) for a discussion of interpreting a representative
agent as an aggregation of heterogeneous individuals. He suggests that assuming that multiple
heterogeneous agents populate the economy circumvents many of the theoretical contradictions
that arise under the representative agent assumption, and at the same time is intuitively more
appealing as a descriptive model. He writes ￿Given the arguments presented here (...) it is
clear that the representative agent should have no future. Indeed, contrary to what current
macroeconomic practice seems to suggest, requiring heterogeneity of agents within the compet-
itive general equilibrium model may help to recover aggregate properties, which may be useful
for macroeconomic analysis.￿
20. See Plott (1996) for a detailed discussion of stages of rationality in economic experiments.
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TABLE 1− ESTIMATES OF MODEL OF CONVERGENCE, MARKET TREATMENT, HIGH ENDOWMENT 
 
1 1MktH β  
 
2 1MktH β  
 
3 1MktH β  
 

















12 0.0851  12.24 
(1.32) 










0 0.1923  0.93 
(0.96) 
Capital Stock 













10 0.5956  9.86 
(2.07) 
Price of K 












180 0.6345  178.83 
(10.55) 
Realized 
) ( t C u as 












1 0.1695  0.991 
(0.090) 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. N = 87.  
 
TABLE 2− ESTIMATES OF MODEL OF CONVERGENCE, MARKET TREATMENT, LOW ENDOWMENT 
 
1 1MktL β  
 
2 1MktL β  
 
3 1MktL β  
 
















12  −−−− 0.1385  11.83 
(1.49) 








0 0.2578  1.13 
(0.98) 
Capital Stock 









10 0.7561  10.35 
(4.05) 
Price of K 










180 0.3415  178.80 
(30.31) 
Realized ) ( t C u  as 










1  −−−− 0.1269  0.960 
(0.092) 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. N = 92.  
 
TABLE 3− ESTIMATES OF MODEL OF CONVERGENCE,  
 
SOCIAL PLANNER TREATMENT, HIGH ENDOWMENT 
 
  1 1SpH β  
 
2 1SpH β  
 
3 1SpH β  
 
4 1SpH β  


















12  −−−− 0.0430  10.96 
(4.05) 










0 0.1167  3.20 
(2.66) 
Capital Stock 












10 0.7062  10.29 
(6.54) 
Realized 
) ( t C u as 












1 0.0883  0.905 
(0.275) 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. N = 142.  
 
TABLE 4− ESTIMATES OF MODEL OF CONVERGENCE,  
 
SOCIAL PLANNER TREATMENT, LOW ENDOWMENT 
 
  1 1SpL β  
 
2 1SpL β  
 
3 1SpL β  
 
4 1SpL β  























12  −−−− 0.1981  11.79 
 
(3.99) 
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TABLE 5− ESTIMATES OF MODEL OF CONVERGENCE,  
PLANNING AGENCY TREATMENT, HIGH ENDOWMENT 
  1 1PaH β  
 
2 1PaH β  
 
3 1PaH β  
 




















12  − 0.1367  12.14 
 
(3.77) 
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Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. N = 98. 
  
 
TABLE 6− ESTIMATES OF MODEL OF CONVERGENCE, 
PLANNING AGENCY TREATMENT, LOW ENDOWMENT 
  1 1PaL β  
 
2 1PaL β  
 
3 1PaL β  
 



















12  − 0.1264  12.01 
 
(2.65) 
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FIGURE 1. INDIVIDUAL AND AGGREGATE PRODUCTION FUNCTION 
 
 
FIGURE 2. TIMING WITHIN PERIOD t  
 
 
FIGURE 3. ACTIVITY OF COHORT MktH1 
 
 
FIGURE 4. TIME SERIES OF CONSUMPTION: MARKET TREATMENT, ALL HORIZONS, HIGH 
ENDOWMENT 
 
  Notes: a, b, c, and d denote the first, second, third, and fourth horizons that a cohort participated 
  in. C bar denotes the consumption level in the steady state equilibrium.   
 
 
FIGURE 5. TIME SERIES OF CONSUMPTION: MARKET TREATMENT, ALL HORIZONS, LOW 
ENDOWMENT  
 
 Notes: a, b, and c denote the first, second, and third horizons that a cohort participated in. C bar 
  denotes the consumption level in the steady state equilibrium.   
 
 
FIGURE 6. ACTUAL PRODUCTION VS. EFFICIENT PRODUCTION FOR COHORT MktL2 
 
 
FIGURE 7. TIME SERIES OF CONSUMPTION: SOCIAL PLANNER TREATMENT, ALL 
HORIZONS, HIGH ENDOWMENT  
 
  Notes: a, b, c, and d denote the first, second, third, and fourth horizons that a cohort participated 
  in. C bar denotes the consumption level in the steady state equilibrium.   
 
 
FIGURE 8. TIME SERIES OF CONSUMPTION: SOCIAL PLANNER TREATMENT, ALL 
HORIZONS, LOW ENDOWMENT 
 
  Notes: a, b, c, and d denote the first, second, third, and fourth horizons that a cohort participated 
  in. C bar denotes the consumption level in the steady state equilibrium.   
 
 
FIGURE 9. TIME SERIES OF CONSUMPTION: PLANNING AGENCY TREATMENT, ALL 
HORIZONS, HIGH ENDOWMENT 
 
 Notes: a, b, and c denote the first, second, and third horizons that a cohort participated in. C bar 




FIGURE 10. TIME SERIES OF CONSUMPTION: PLANNING AGENCY TREATMENT, ALL 
HORIZONS, LOW ENDOWMENT 
 
 Notes: a, b, and c denote the first, second, and third horizons that a cohort participated in. C bar 




























































































































Figure 1.  
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